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TAXATION OF INTER-STATE TRAVEL.
THE Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company has refused to pay
to the state of Maryland certain sums of money, claimed by that
state, upon the ground that the statutes, imposing the obligation,
are unconstitutional and void, in so far as they impose the duty
of making the payment referred to in those acts.
The questions involved are of general interest, and we propose
to state the grounds upon which the claim of the state of Maryland has been resisted.
The Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland, which have
given rise to the controversy, are as follows:"Be it enacted, 4-c. That the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company shall be
entitled to charge and take as a compensation for the use of the railroad, which
they are authorized to construct by this act, and for the conveyance of passengers
and transportation of property thereon, at and not exceeding the following rates
and amounts, to wit: for conveying any person, or transporting any parcel, or
property, any distance whatever, twelve and a half cents ; for conveying each
person the whole distance between Baltimore and Washington, not exceeding one
dollar and fifty cents, and four cents per mile for any part of the distance more
than three miles."
1830, ch. 158, sect. 3.
"And be it enacted, That the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company shall be
entitled to charge and take for conveying each person the whole distance between the
cities of Baltirnoreand Washington, not exceeding two dollars and-fifty cents, and in
proportionfor every shorter distance." 1832, ch. 175, sect. 7.
"And be it enacted, That the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company shall pay
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to the t-easurer of the Western Shore of Maryland, on the first Monday in January
and July, in each and every year, for the use of the state, one-fifth of the whole
amount which may be received for the tran.portationof passengers on said railroad by
said company during the six months last preceding; and it shall be the duty of the
president or chief officer of the Baltimore andOhio :Railroad Company, to exhibit,
on oath or affirmation, to the General Assembly, on the first day of January,
or as soon thereafter as the said Assembly shall convene, in each and every year,
an account, showing the gross amount received by said company for the transportation of passengers on said road, and the state's proportion thereof; provided, that the chargefor conveying each person the whole distance between the cities
of Baltinwre and Washington shall not be reduced below the maximum of two dollars
and a half, hereinbefore established, unless by the consent of the General Assembly,
or in the recess of that body, by the consent of the governor and council, which
consent shall be effective until the end of the session of the General Assembly
next ensuing; and provided also, that in no case shall the amount received by the
statefrom the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Conpanyfor the conveyance of each person the whole distance between the two cities, be less than twenty-five cents; and provided, that at any time and at all times, whenever an application is made to the
legislature by said company to reduce said maximum price, it shall be lawful
for the legislature to make such regulation of charge as it may deem necessary,
not reducing the transportation of passengers to the company below one dollar
and fifty cents for the whole distance, and rateably for any shorter distance." 1832,
ch. 175, sec. 4.
"Be it enacted, That the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company shall be author:zed to regulate the tolls to be paid for the transportation of passengers on the
Washington Branch of the said road, in their discretion, not exceeding the maximum heretofore fixed by law, Provided, that one-fifth of the pasage-money received
from the said Branch Road be accounted for and paid into the state treasury, as now
required by law." 1852, ch. 328.

The Act of 1830, above quoted, gave to the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company the right to charge one dollar and fifty,
cents for conveying each person the whole distance between
Baltimore and Washington; but this power was operative and
valid only within the state of Maryland.
The Act of 1832, above quoted, in terms conferred a new,
specific, and unconditional power upon the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company to charge two dollars and fifty cents for conveying each person the whole distance between Baltimore and
Washington, and in proportion for every shorter distance; but
this provision, also, was only valid and operative within the state
of Maryland.
The grant of power thus made, enabled the company to charge,
within the limits of the state of Marylancl, the proportionable
rate, authorized by this section, although the sta' ,had not the
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power to extend this increased rate to passengers travelling from
point to point in the District of Columbia.
The grant of power thus made was good and valid, within the
state of Maryland, and remained to that extent effectual and
operative, even if other parts of the act were invalid: State v.
Davis, 7 Md. 151; Commonwealth v. ffitching8, 5 Gray 482;
Mayor of Hfagerstown v. .Dechert, 32 Md. 384, BARTOL, C. J.
It did not operate as a valid grant of power within the D)istrict
of Columbia, because the right to collect tolls is a prerogative
franchise (Redfield on Railways, ed. 1867, p. 87), and no state
can make such a grant of power operative beyond its territorial
limits. The company, within the District of Columbia, had no
power to make any other charge than that permitted by the Act
of Congress of March 2d 1831.
We shall now endeavor to show that the requirement made
by the Act .of 1832, ch. 175, sect. 8, to pay the money therein
referred to into the treasury of the state of Maryland is unconstitutional and void, because it imposes a tax upon every person
travelling upon the Washington Branch Road of the defendant,
which tax is required to be collected by the company, and to be
by it paid into the treasury of the state.
Every citizen of the United States, being a citizen and resident of any particular state, has a right to travel into or through
any other state without paying for such privilege of entry, or
transit, any tax or charge to the state into or through which he
shall so travel. For, being a citizen of another state, and subject
to its jurisdiction and taxing power, and not being temporarily
resident even of the state into which he may enter for a purpose
of travel or transit only, he cannot constitutionally be taxed by
such state.
Such a power of taxation was substantially denied to the confederated states in the original Articles of Confederation; for
therein it was declared that "the people of each state shall have
free ingress and egress to and from any other state ;" and it cannot
be supposed that the Constitution of the United States intended
to leave a larger power in the states, over citizens of other states,
than was conferred by the Articles of Confederation.
In the case of MfcCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, the
limit and subject of the taxing power of a state is thus set forth:
"The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which
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exists by its authority, or is introduced by its permission." ***

"If we measure the power of taxation residing in a state, by
the extent of sovereignty which the people of a single state
possess and can.confer on its government, we have an intelligible standard applicable to every case to which the power may be
applied."
A yet more emphatic expression of the true limit existing
upon the taxing power of the state is stated in Howell v. &tate,
8 Gill 14, 28.
In the case of Hayes v. The Pacific Mail Steamship Company,
17 Howard 598, 599, 600, it was decided that ships engaged in
the business and commerce of the country, owned- and taxed at
their home ports, and temporarily at a port within the jurisdiction of another state, are not subject to the taxing power of
such state, because "not properly abiding within its limits so as
to become incorporated with the other personal property of the
state." They are "there temporarily engaged in lawful trade
and commerce, with their situs at the home port, where the vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for
the capital invested."
If a steamship, touching for a few days or hours at a port
within the limits of another state, is not subject to taxation by
that state, because it is taxed elsewhere, and does not so abide
within its limits as to become incorporated with other per8onal
property liable to taxation in such state, it would seem to be
unanswerably true that a citizen of another state, entering temporarily into the state of Maryland, in pursuit of some lawful
purpose, but having his*residence in another state, and being of
necessity bound to pay taxes in such state, can, under no circumstances, be subjected to a tax for the support of the government
of Maryland, into which he has temporarily entered. Before
such a person can be so taxed, he must in fact reside in Maryland, and become, by reason of his fixed residence, a part of the
mass of that people resident in the state which is, from the nature
"ofstate government, bound to contribute to its support.
If he is not a citizen or resident of Maryland, but is a citizen
of any other of the United States, then by reason of the relation
of these states to each other, and because of the common interest
of the citizens of each state in pursuits and localities permitted
and open to citizens of all the states, and because of the common
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right of citizens of every state to enter and traverse every other
state, and because of his being in nowise bound to pay taxes,
while so engaged, to any power except his own state and to the
United States, he is free to enter and depart from any other state
without suffering the imposition of any charge, tax, or burthens
from the state he shall so enter.
Such unquestionably has been the ruling of the Supreme
Court.
In the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 492, Chief Justice TANEY
said: "Living as we do under a common government, charged
with the great concerns of the whole Union, every citizen of the
United States, from the most remote states or territories, is
entitled to free access, not only to the principal departments
established at Washington, but also to its judicial tribunals and
public offices in every state in the Union. * * For all the
great purposes for which the Federal Government was formed
we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens
of the United States, and as members of the same community
must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it
without interruption, as freely as in our own states. And a tax
imposed by a state for entering its territories or harbors is inconsistent with the rights which belong to citizens of other states as
members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union
was intended to attain. Such a power in the states could produce
nothing but discord and mutual irritation, and they very clearly
do not possess it."
Although this language forms part of a dissenting opinion in
the Passenger Cases, yet it forms a part of the judgment of the
same court in the case of Crandall v. The State of Nevada, 6
Wall. 48, and it is to be taken as undisputed law.
By section 8 of the Act of 1832, ch. 175, it is provided that
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company shall not reduce the
charge for conveying passengers the whole distance between
Baltimore and Washington below the maximum fixed by section
7 of the same act, of two dollars and a half, unless with the consent of the General Assembly, or, in the recess of that body, with
the consent of the governor and council.
As by the 7th section the company could not increase the particular charge beyond two dollars and fifty cents, and by the 8th
section could not make it less than two dollars and fifty cents, it
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is plain that the requirement of the 8th section, which obliged
the company to pay into the treasury, at the periods named, onefifth of the whole amount received for the transportation of passengers on said railroad during the six months last preceding,
was, in substance and in fact, a provision by which the state
-should receive from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company
the precise sum of fifty cents for each traveller transported the
whole distance between Baltimore and Washington.
By the Act of 1830, ch. 158, sect. 3, the company was authorized to charge one -dollar and fifty cents for the transportation
of every passenger between Baltimore and Washington, and at
the rate of four cents per mile for certain lesser distances.
By the Act of 1832, ch. 175, sect. 6, it was both authorized
and compelled, if it accepted the provisions of that act, to charge
the sum of two dollars and a half for transporting a passenger
the whole distance between Baltimore and Washington, and it
was authorized to charge in proportion, that ii to say, in fact,
six cents and a quarter per mile for conveying a passenger every
shorter distance; but it was required to pay to the state onefifth of the whole amount so charged and received for the transportation of passengers.
This was in effect to provide that the company might increase
its charge between the two cities from one dollar and fifty cents
to two dollars and fifty cents upon each through passenger, and
from four cents per mile to six and one quarter cents per mile
upon each way-passenger; but that it should also give to the
state fifty cents out of the additional dollar paid by each through
passenger, and one and a quarter cents out of the two and a
quarter additional cents paid per mile by each way-passenger.
While the company, therefore, was in fact authorized to increase its charge for the service which it performed to travellers,
by the sum of fifty cents for each through passenger and threequarters of a cent per-mile for each way-passenger, the duty was
also imposed upon it to charge and collect in its own name, but for
the use of the state, fifty cents additional for every through passenger between Baltimore and Washington, and one and a quarter
cents additionalper mile from every way-passenger on such road.
It is asserted that this arrangement was a mere contract, by
which the contractors agreed to pay to the state, in each year, in
consideration of receiving certain concessions, a stipulated por-
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tion of its gross receipts; and that such arrangement cannot
rightfully be considered as imposing a tax either upon the corporation or upon the passengers; but that if it could be considered
as a tax, it must be held to be a tax not upon the passenger, but
upon the corporation, and as amounting pro tanto to. a waiver of
the exemption from taxation secured to the company by the Act
of 1826, ch. 123, sect. 18.
It was not a simple agreement to pay to the state a portion of
the gross receipts of the company. It was, on the contrary, a
provision of law by which the state gave power to the company
to increase the amount of its gross receipts from each passenger
in order that a portion of such increase should be so received
for the use of the state, and should be paid into the treasury of
the state.
It operated as a direct tax upon the passenger, and this unconstitutional exercise of power cannot be accomplished by a form
of contract with a company engaged in the transportation of passengers. Nor was the act intended to operate as an agreed tax
imposed upon the company by its own consent; for it authorized
such rates of charge as left the company, if it exercised its
powers, in the possession of larger revenues, after paying the
tax, than it had under the privilege of complete exemption,
which it enjoyed before the passage of the Act of 1832, ch.
175. It was an agreed tax, but it was imposed on those who
were not parties to the agreement.
The revenue thus derived by the state was not a dividend upon
any investment in the company. The state had subscribed to
the special stock of the Washington Branch Road under a separate and distinct contract, authorized in the Act of 1832, ch.
175, § 1, and was authotlzied to receive its share, as a stockholder,
of the net profits of the branch road (1832, ch. 175, §§ 2 and
3) ; but a share in the gross receipts made no part of any legal
dividend.
The revenue thus derived by the state was not interest payable
upon any debt, because the state was not in fact a creditor of the
Washington Branch Road. -It was not a semi-annual price or
bonus paid by the company for the privilege of constructing the
road, %and operating it in connection with a road built under the
authority of Congress, for the price was not in fact paid by the
company. It was paid by those who travelled upon the road, as
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a part of the price, of their journey, although it enured to the
exclusive use and benefit of the state.
If the money secured to the state by the operation of the Act
of 1832, ch. 175, § 8, was neither dividend, interest, or bonus,
what then was it? It was a tax imposed by the state upon every
passenger travelling upon the Washington Branch Road.
One single illustration will complete the proof upon this point.
The Act of 1832, ch. 175, § 8, itself demonstrates that it was
intended that the act should produce a specific revenue to the
state from each passenger, because it provides that in no case
shall the amount received by the state from. the -Baltimore and
Ohio .ailroad Company, for the conveyance of each person the
whole distance between the- two cities, be less than twenty-five
cents.
The statute in question, it is believed, coula not have operated
differently or more specifically upon .each passenger, if it had
provided that each passenger should pay a certain schedule of
prices upon the branch road-four-fifths of which price should be
paid by such passenger to the company for its transportation,
and one-fifth to the state for the privilege of transit. The act
made the levy as completely on each passenger as the Act of
1843, ch. 289, made it upon the dividends of the stockholders
referred to in that act: State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill 494, 497, 498.
It was a legislative levy. Nor is the company, in this case, more
a tax collector than in the case just cited.
The general argument that the tax imposed by the legislation
to which reference has been made, if it be conceded that a tax
is thereby imposed, is a tax upon the company, and one to which
it has given its corporate assent, and not a tax upon the passengers, is answered by the case of State A.Mayhew, 6 Gill 495,
already cited, and is identical, moreover, in kind with that
insisted upon by Maryland in the case of Brown v. State of
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. In that case it was argued that the
Act of Assembly requiring the importer of foreign goods by the
bale or package, and other persons selling the same, by wholesale,
bale or package, to take out a license from the state, did not
impose a tax upon the article, but on the person, as it is here
argued that the tax is upon the company and not upon the passenger. But the court said: "It is impossible to conceal from
ourselves that this is varying the form without varying the sub-
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stance; it is treating a prohibition which is general, as if it were
confined to a particular mode of doing the forbidden thing. All
must perceive that the tax on the sale of. an article imported
only for sale, is a tax on the article itself."
If a tax on the sale of an article imported. only for sale, is a
tax on the article itself, then assuredly.a tax on the price of a
passage, paid only for the purpose of securing the passage, is a
tax on the passenger himself. If the tax on.the occupation of
an importer isa tax on importation, a fortiori, a tax on the particular money paid by the passenger is a.tax on the passenger.
It must add to the price of a passage, and'be paid by the passenger, in the same manner as if it were a tax levied on the passenger
himself, because of his seeking such transportation.
So in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, it was insisted that
the taxes, provided for in the acts then under discussion, were
imposed upon the owners of ships, and not upon passengers.
The law of Massachusetts provided that the owner, master,
consignee, or agent of any vessel arriving in any port in that
state, having certain alien passengers on board, should pay to the
state boarding ofcer the sum of two dollars for each passenger
so landed.
The law of New York provided that the master of every vessel
coming from a foreign port or from a domestic port into the port
of New York, should pay to the health commissioner of that
port certain charges or sums for each person on board.
The Supreme Court held these laws to be unconstitutional and
void; and the following extracts from the opinions will show the
reason for the judgment of the court: "An impost, in its enlarged
sense, means any tax or tribute imposed by authority, and applies
as well to a tax on persons as to a tax on merchandise."
"If this power to tax passengersfrom a foreign country belongs
to a state, a tax, on the same principle, may be imposed on all
persons coming into or passing through it from any other state of
the Union. And the New-York statute does in fact lay a tax on
passengers on board of any coasting vessel which arrives at the
port of New York, with an exception of passengers in vessels
from New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, who are required
to pay for one trip in each month. All other passengers pay the
tax every trip.
"If this may be done in New York, every other state may do
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the same, on all the lines of our internal navigation. Passengers
on a steamboat which plies on the Ohio, the Mississippi, or on any
of our other rivers, or on the lakes, may be required to pay a
tax, imposed at the discretion of each state within which the boat
shall touch. And the same principle will sustain a right in every
state to tax all persons who shall pass through its territory on
,ailroad cars, canal-boats, stages, or in any other manner. This
would enable a state to establish and enforce a non-intercourse
with every other state :" Passenger Cases, 7 How. 407, opinion
of Justice McLEA N. See also Justice CATRON'S opinion, pp.
445, 446, and especially the opinion of Justice GRIER, on pp.
458-462.
Judge GRIER, in his opinion, assumes that the obligation of
the master or owner to pay a certain sum upon each passenger
transported in his vessel amounted, in fact, to a tax upon the
passenger. He says, on pp. 460, 461, "It must be admitted that
it is not an exercise of the usual power to tax persons resident
within a state, and their property, but is a tax on passengers,
qua passengers. It is a condition annexed to a license to them to
Pass through the state on their journey to other states. It is
founded on a claim by a state of the power to exclude all persons
from entering her ports or passing through her territory.
"It is true, that if a state has such an absolute and uncontrolled right to exclude, the inference that she may prescribe the
conditions of entrance, in the shape of a license or a tax, must
necessarily follow. The conclusion cannot be evaded if the premises be proved. A right to exclude is a power to tax; and the
converse of the proposition is also true, that a power to tax is a
power to exclude; and it follows, as a necessary result from this
doctrine, that those states in which are situated the great ports
or gates of commerce have a right to exclude, if they see fit, all
emigrants from access to the interior states, and to prescribe the
conditions on which they shall be allowed to proceed on their
journey, whether it be the payment of two or two hundred dollars."
-In the case of Crandallv. State of Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, it was
asserted on the part of the state that the tax imposed was levied
on the carrier, or person engaged in the business of transportation, not upon the passenger. But the Supreme Court said: "If
the act were much more skilfully drawn to sustain this hypothesis
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than it is, we should be very reluctant to admit that anyform of
words, which. had the effect to compel every person travelling through
the country by the common and usual modes of public conveyance
to pay a specific sum to the state, was not a taz upon the right
thus exercised."
The court having reached the conclusion that the act in question did in fact impose a tax on the passengers, for the privilege
of leaving the state, or passing through it by the ordinary means
of passenger travel, and after recognising in this case, as in the
Passenger Cases, that the tax was demanded from other persons
than the passengers only for convenience of collection, proceeded
to inquire if such tax was in conflict with the Constitution of
the United States.

* * * *

It said: "The

people of these

United States constitute one nation. They have a government
in which all of them are deeply interested. This government
has necessarily a capital established by law, where its principal
operations are conducted. Here sits its legislature, composed of
senators and representatives, from the states and .from the people
of the states. Here resides the President, directing, through
thousands of agents, the execution of the laws over all this vast
country. Here is the seat of the supreme judicial power of the
nation, to which all its citizens have a right to resort to claim
justice at its hands. Here are the great executive departments,
administering the offices of the mails, of the public lands, of the
collection and distribution of the public revenues, and of our
foreign relations. These are all established and conducted under
the admitted powers of the Federal Government. That government has a right to call to this point any or all of its citizens to
aid in its service, as members of the Congress, of, the courts, of
the executive departments, and to fill all its other offices ;and
this right cannot be made to depend upon the pleasure of a state,
over whose territory they must pass to reach the point where
these services must be rendered. The government also has its
offices of secondary importance inall other parts of the country.
On the seacoasts and on the rivers it has its ports of entry. In
the interior it has its land offices, its revenue offices, and its subtreasuries. In all these it demands the services of its 'citizens,
and is entitled to bring them to those points from all quarters of
the nation, and no power can exist in a state to obstruct this
right that would not enable it to defeat the purposes for which
the government was established."
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"But if the government has these rights on her own account,
the citizen also has correlative rights. He has the right to come
to tke seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon
that government, or to transact any business he may have with
it-to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in
administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its
seaports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and
commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices,
the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several states,
and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any
state over whose soil he must pass in the exercis e of it.
"The views here advanced are neither novel nor unsupported
by authority. The question of the taxing power of the states,
as its exercise has affected the functions of the federal government, has been repeatedly considered by this-court, and the right
of the states in this mode to impede or embarrass the constitutional operations of that government, or the-right, which its citizens hold under it, has been uniformly denied& * * *
"So in the case before us, it may be said. that.a: tax of one
dollar for passing through the state of Nevada,.by stage-coach
or by railroad, cannot sensibly affect.any function of the government, or deprive a citizen of any valuable right. But if the
state can tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him one
thousand dollars. If one state can do this, so can every other
state. And thus one or more states covering the only practicable
routes of travel from the east to the west, or from the north to the
south, may totally prevent or seriously burden all transportation
of passengers from one part of the country to the other."
See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 319; Steams8ipC'ompany v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 82; Hinson v. Lott, 8
Id. 152.
We are not obliged to discuss the validity of the laws of the
state of Maryland, already alluded to, in their relation to the
power of Congress over inter-state commerce. The portions of
the acts already quoted would seem to be unquestionably void, because they relate to subjects which are "in their nature national,
and admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation," and
are, therefore, void as regulations of a species of commerce, which
the constitution designed to leave subject to the exclusive control
of Congress: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; JMinot v. Phila.,
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Wilm. & Balt. Railroad Co., in Circuit Court of U. S., Delaware
District, 1870. Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, December 16th
1870.
It is greatly to be regretted that the opinions delivered by the
several judges of the Supreme Court in the cases :of Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; City of New York v. Milne, 11 Peters 102;
The License Cases, 5 How. 504; Yhe Passenger Cases, 7 'Id.;
Almy v. State of California, 24 Id. 169; Woodruff v. Parham,
8 Wall. 123; Hinson v. Lott, Id. 148, do not afford any.complete
or harmonious exposition of the relative power of the United
States, and of the several states, over the question of internal
commerce. But without noticing the points of essential difference, presented by certain of the opinions given by the judges
in these several cases, it is sufficient to say that the Supreme
Court, in its latest adjudications upon the questions involved in
this discussion, has reaffirmed the case of Crandall v. State of
NYevada: Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 138; Hinon v. Lott,
Id. 152.
And since, in the case of Crandall v. State of Nevada, the
judgment of the court rested in great part upon portions of the
able opinion of Chief Justice TANEY in the Passenger Cases,
and gave to that opinion, to the extent of the principle involved
in this case, the force of authority, we may safely omit all examination of the cases involving the regulation of inter-state commerce, and, while we assert their authority, rest mainly upon the
simple and conclusive statement with which the late Chief Justice
closed his opinion in the Passenger Cases:"A tax imposed by a state for entering its territories or harbors is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the citizens
of other states, as members of the Union, and with the objects
which that Union was intended to attain. Such a power in the
states could produce nothing but discord and mutual irritation,
and they very clearly do not possess it :" 7 How. 492.
The Act of 1852, ch. 328, did not in anywise obviate the constitutional objection urged to the validity of the Act of 1832,
ch. 175, § 8. This later act did not change the substantial
nature of the arrangement made between the state and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, except by substituting an ad
valorem tax for a specific duty. The effect of this amendatory
act was equally to "add to the price of the article;" and the
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tax thus levied was, in fact, paid by the passenger in like manner
as a direct tax levied upon himself would have been paid: Brown
v. &ate of ffaryland, 12 Wheat. 419.
Nor did this Act so operate as to transfer the tax imposed by
the Act of 1832, ch. 175, sect. 8, from the passengers to the
company; for this act also added the tax levied under the Act of
1832, ch. 175, sect. 8, as thus modified, to the price of the transportation, and this tax was necessarily paid by the passenger:
Brown v. State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. It is indeed apparent from the structure of the amendatory act that it was not
intended to impose any tax upon the company. It conferred no
additional means of obtaining revenue upon the company, and
therefore there was no apparent reason for making its enactment
the occasion of a tax. On the contrary, it only permitted the
company to charge a lower rate than it was then compelled to
charge, and to revise its rate from time to time, as occasion might
demand. But as the control thus given to the company over its
own rates did not permit the state to ascertain by specific legislation the precise sum which it would receive from each passenger,
an ad valorem rate of 20 per cent. was of necessity substituted
in the place of the specific tax of 20 per cent. formerly imposed
upon the specific fare of two dollars and fifty cents, which each
passenger had been previously obliged to pay.
The state, in making this change in the system of its taxation,
was governed manifestly by the same reasons which have from
time to time induced Congress to substitute ad valorem duties for
tecic duties. Such imposts adjust themselves more readily to
the fluctuating wants of commercial intercourse; but they are,
equally with specific duties, imposts levied for the support of the
,government which imposes them.
There can be little doubt that the Supreme Court of the United
States will pronounce the legislation of Maryland, to which we
have called attention in this paper, to be as objectionable in
principle as was the statute of Nevada; and that it will prescribe,
in unmistakable language, the rule that no state has a right to
levy taxes in any form upon those who, residing in another state,
are exercising their constitutional right of travel from the state
in which they reside to the seat of the National Government, or
to any part of any of the other states or territories of the Union.
C. J. M. GWINH.

